Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.

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Paulo marked it as to-read Aug 16, Contemporary philosophers generally deny that we are infallible knowlede omniscient about our mental states. Even if they are so triggered, and the process creates a new belief, the self-attributions may nonetheless qualify as knowledge about what one believes at the time of the self-attribution.

A relevant contrast here is with the reasons account.

Self-Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

But there is little agreement about what precisely distinguishes self-knowledge from knowledge in other realms. But gedtler maintain that the need for observation signals that the attitude is problematic.

She is not committed to a particular account of how avowals constitute knowledge, but she presents a number of approaches compatible with her neo-expressivism.

We now consider the prospects for agentialism generally. Brie Gertler – – Philosophical Topics 28 2: John Hyman – – Mind Some critics charge that acquaintance accounts construe introspective beliefs as too close to their objects to qualify as genuine, substantial knowledge.

Lists with This Book. Dissonance and Moorean Propositions. Some philosophers take attitudes to be relational in another way as well, namely that attitude contents depend on relations to the environment: Some philosophers also argue that conscious attitudes, such as judgments, have distinctive phenomenologies.

Among Gertler’s other fields of study are epistemology and the philosophy of language. Here, Moran expresses the agentialist outlook. Self-Knowledge by Brie Gertler.


These may be clearly perceived provided we take great care in our judgments concerning them to include no more than what is strictly contained in our perception—no more than that of which we have inner awareness.


Gertler assesses gertlwr leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: Only these first two statements construe the distinctive feature of self-knowledge as plainly epistemic; however, most who endorse 3 also claim that this agential relation grounds a special epistemic relation. Kathleen marked it as to-read Dec 20, A common objection to even limited infallibility claims is the idea, often attributed to Wittgenstein, that where one cannot be wrong, one cannot be right either.

His argument that such thinkers must be capable of self-knowledge rests on hertler objections to perceptual models of introspection, outlined in 3. Jeremy Russell marked it as to-read Nov 16, The first is exegetical: Fertler and Practical Knowledge.

Self-Knowledge by Brie Gertler (ebook)

Self-Knowledge by Brie Gertler. Suki Bapswent is currently reading it Nov 17, The transparency theorist cannot respond to this worry by stipulating that, when considering whether pone should not draw any new conclusions.

Doubts about self-knowledge are also fueled by more general epistemological concerns, such as the familiar worry that the observational process gertelr alters the target of observation Hill[ 1 ] and doubts about the possibility of theory-free observations Dennett This is not to say that our capacity for reasoning selc no role in these theories; after all, these are intended to explain how self-knowledge is achieved by thinkers like us, who can engage in ordinary reasoning such as making inferences and recognizing plain conceptual truths.

For more on that question, see Bayne and Montague James Kern Feibleman – – M. It is thus self-verifying, and hence may constitute knowledge on the basis of nothing beyond that thought Burge Although agentialists generally downplay the significance of the epistemic, agentialists must explain why certain self-attributions qualify as knowledge; otherwise, agentialism is not a genuine competitor to the accounts of self-knowledge described above.

These agentialist accounts will be discussed in subsection 3. In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: First-person authority stems from the fact that it is only the subject herself who can directly express her states through an avowal.


Slef contends that these arguments do not directly threaten inner sense accounts. To establish this point, Burge uses the following seemingly transcendental reasoning.

But it also limits that gertper, to beliefs that the thinker regards as justified. Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Carruthers argues that the frequency with which we selt about our own attitudes, through confabulation or other sorts of processes, supports the claim that in identifying our own attitudes we are forced to engage—often unsuccessfully—in self-interpretation.

The core of neo-expressivism is its non-epistemic account of phenomena often associated with self-knowledge, namely, first-person authority.

Acquaintance accounts provide for highly secure beliefs that are justified by experiences rather than by other beliefs. This paper has two goals. Published January 27th by Routledge first published January 1st Inner sense accounts imply that self-blindness is possible, Shoemaker thinks, because they regard the capacity for self-knowledge knowlledge on a par with sensory capacities like vision, and hence as a capacity that a rational person might lack.

Strikingly, their disagreement about the reliability of introspection remains even after their lengthy discussion of the sel. Agentialist accounts discussed in the next section also take our status as rational thinkers to contribute substantially to getler, but on agentialist views this contribution is linked with the agency exercised in rational deliberation.

But since this conclusion is silent as to how such awareness occurs, it does not rule out the possibility that it is achieved through inner sense. Sign in to use this feature.